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TORT LAW-FoRECASTS FOR DISCRETION: AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
BROWN AND EKLOF DECISIONs-Brown v. United States, 790 F.2d 199 
(1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 938 (1987); EklofMarine Corp. 
v. United States, 762 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1985). 
INTRODUCTION 
Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (hereinafter FTCA) en­
acted in 1946,1 liability is generally imposed on the federal government 
whenever the government negligently undertakes an activity. One 
limit to broad government liability is the statutory exception for an act 
which is discretionary in nature.2 Historically, court decisions con­
cerning the imposition of liability on the government have been ex­
tremely inconsistent,3 due primarily to the substantial difficulty the 
courts have encountered interpreting the discretionary function excep­
tion to the FTCA.4 Recently, this inconsistency has evidenced itself 
in two decisions by the federal courts of appeals. 
In the case of EklofMarine Corp. v. United States,S the Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled that the United States Coast 
Guard was potentially liable to the owners of a vessel which ran 
aground and was seriously damaged due to the Coast Guard's negli­
gent placement of a navigational buoy.6 The United States Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit was faced with a similar situation in the 
case of Brown v. United States. 7 In that case, that court rejected the 
reasoning of Eklof and held that an instrumentality of the United 
States, the National Weather Service (hereinafter NWS), was not lia­
ble for the death of several fishermen who drowned in a storm at sea.8 
The NWS had failed to predict the storm primarily because of a mal­
functioning weather observation buoy. 
Despite their apparent inconsistency, both the Eklof and Brown 
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1982). For the relevant text of this section see infra text accom­
panying note 15. 
2. See infra note 17 and accompanying text. 
3. See infra notes 18-61 and accompanying text. 
4. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). For the text of this section see infra text accOmpany­
ing note 17. 
5. 762 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1985). 
6. Id. at 205. 
7. 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 938 (1987). 
8. Id. 
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decisions are in accord with precedence. The court in Eklof ruled that 
when the federal government performs a discretionary act such as the 
placement of a navigational buoy to aid vessels, it has a duty to use 
reasonable care and will be held liable if this duty is breached.9 The 
Eklof decision is in agreement with a prior Supreme Court decision 
that imposed liability on the Coast Guard.1O In contrast, the court in 
Brown ruled that when the federal government performs a discretion­
ary act, such as the preparation of a weather forecast for an area 
which contains a malfunctioning weather observation buoy, it is pro­
tected by immunity for any untoward consequences. I I The Brown de­
cision is consistent with prior federal court decisions limiting 
government liability for weather forecasting. 12 
In an attempt to understand and explain these two conflicting in­
terpretations of the discretionary function exception, Part I of this 
note sets forth the background and substance of the FTCA and the 
discretionary function exception. In this section the note focuses upon 
the legislative history and congressional intent behind the Act and in­
cludes an analysis of how the Supreme Court has applied the FTCA. 
Part II describes the Brown and Eklof decisions including the facts 
and issues the courts dealt with, the discretionary activities in ques­
tion, and the reasoning employed to reach their respective conclusions. 
Part III discusses the similarities and differences between the two 
cases as well as the express and silent concerns of the courts. It identi­
fies and analyzes the reasons why the courts reached diametrically op­
posite conclusions. Part IV suggests that the solution to the prospect 
of future judicial inconsistency in this area is further legislative clarifi­
cation from Congress. 
I. THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT AND THE DISCRETIONARY 

FUNCTION EXCEPTION 

Congress passed the FTCA after nearly thirty years of debate. 13 
The Act was the result of a congressional decision to allow private 
citizens easy access to the federal courts for tort claims arising out of 
9. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 200. 
10. United States v. Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. 61 (1955). For a discussion of 
Indian Towing, see infra notes 41-46 and accompanying text. 
11. Brown, 790 F.2d at 199. 
12. See infra note 137 and accompanying text. 
13. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-601, 60 Stat. 812 (1946). 
For a discussion of the legislative history of the Act, and specifically Title IV-The Tort 
Claims Act, see Ford, The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, 32 A.B.A. J. 741, 744, 
808 (1946). See also Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 24 (1953) (discussion of the 
background of the Tort Claims Act). 
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the negligent or wrongful acts or omissions of federal government 
employees. 14 
The FfCA, 28 U.S.c. § 1346(b), reads in part: 
[T]he district courts ... shall have exclusive jurisdiction of civil 
actions on claims against the United States, for money damages ... 
for injury or loss of property, or personal ~njury or death caused by 
the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the 
Government while acting within the scope of his office or employ­
ment, under circumstances where the United States, if a private per­
son, would be liable to the claimant in accordance with the law of 
the place where the act or omission occurred. IS 
The Act grants jurisdiction to the federal courts primarily for claims 
arising out of common law torts committed by government employees. 
The application of common law standards is evidenced by the lan­
guage, "if a private person would be liable," and by the requirement 
that the government must act in the same manner that a private indi­
vidual would in order to avoid liability. The Act also allows claims 
against the government to be litigated in federal courts instead of being 
pursued through private bills, which proved to be notoriously 
ineffective. 16 
Congress recognized, however, that strong government depended 
on the ability of government agencies to act freely, exercising discre­
tion without fear of liability. It was this concern which led to the 
14. Dalehite, 346 u.s. at 25. Prior to the passage of the FICA, petitioners had to 
employ a private bill action against the United States. This system was very ineffective. For 
example, in the Seventieth Congress, 2268 private claim bills were put before Congress. 
Out of these only 336 were enacted of which 144 were for tort claims. Id. at 25 n.9. The 
attempt to arrive at legislation to correct this problem can be traced as far back as 1855. In 
that year, Congress first established the Court of Claims where the government consented 
to suits based on contract claims and federal law claims brought by private citizens. In 
1887, Congress expanded this amenability to suit to include all actions not sounding in tort, 
while beginning in 1920 the government allowed suits for the first time on admiralty claims 
and maritime claims involving United States vessels. Id. at 25 n.lO. In commenting on the 
origins of the FICA, the Supreme Court has stated that the FICA came about as a result 
of "inadequa[te] ... congressional machinery for [the] determination of facts, the importu­
nities to which [the] claimants subjected members of Congress, and the capricious results 
... [of the private bills]." Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 140 (1950). These concerns 
led to a strong demand that claims for tort wrongs be submitted to adjudication. Id. 
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1982). 
16. See supra note 14. A further indication that Congress intended the government 
to be treated as a private person would be in a tort claim is evidenced in 28 U.S.C. § 2674 
(1982). That statute reads: "The United States shall be liable, respecting the provisions of 
this title relating to tort claims, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private 
individual under like circumstances, but shall not be liable for interest prior to judgment or 
for punitive damages." Id. 
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enactment of the discretionary function exception, which reads as 
follows: 
[S]ection 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to- ... (a) Any claim 
based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, 
exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, 
whether or not such statute or regulation be valid, or based upon 
the exercise or performance or failure to exercise or perform a dis­
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an 
employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion in­
volved be abused. 17 
By fashioning an exception for discretionary functions, Congress took 
steps to protect the government from liability that would seriously 
handicap efficient government operations. 18 The impact of the discre­
tionary function exception is that the government cannot be held liable 
for damages arising out of ministerial or administrative decisions. 19 
For example, the decision by the government to purchase a certain 
type of vehicle would be unreviewable, but negligence by a govern­
ment employee in the operation of that vehicle would subject the gov­
ernment to liability just as a private individual would be liable in this 
circumstance. The problem, though, is that Congress did not define or 
otherwise explain what is meant by the phrase "discretionary func­
tion," thereby leaving it for the courts to construe. 
A. The Scope of the Federal Tort Claims Act 
Over the years, the courts have attempted to interpret the Act 
and formulate standards which may be applicable for imposing liabil­
17. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982). The other exceptions contained in § 2680 include: 
b) claims based on transmission of letters or postal matters; c) claims with respect to cus­
tom taxes or retention of goods by customs officers; d) claims based on admiralty jurisdic­
tion; e) claims arising out of the administration of title 50; f) damages incurred or caused 
by the imposition of a quarantine by the United States; g) repealed; h) claims based on 
assault, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit or interference with con­
tract relations; i) damages caused by the Treasury's fiscal regulations; j) claims based on 
combatant activity during wartime; k) claims arising in a foreign country; I) claims arising 
from the activities of the Tennessee Valley Authority; m) claims arising from the Panama 
Canal Company; and n) activities and claims due to the activities of the federal land bank, 
intermediate credit bank, or bank for cooperatives. [d. 
18. United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150, 163 (1963) (federal prisoner can sue under 
FICA to recover for personal injuries sustained in a federal prison due to the negligence of 
a federal employee). See a/so United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 808 (1984). In 
Varig, the Supreme Court said that the discretionary function exception marks the bound­
ary between Congress' willingness to impose tort liability upon the United States and a 
desire to protect certain government actions from exposure to suit by private individuals. 
For further discussion of Varig, see infra note 47 and accompanying text. 
19. Dalehite v. United States, 345 U.S. 15,26 (1953); see a/so note 17. 
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ity on the government. In Feres v. United States,20 the Supreme Court 
developed a doctrine which prohibited military personnel from assert­
ing claims against the government when those claims are incident to 
service. In Feres, a member of the armed forces was killed in a fire 
resulting from government negligence and his estate was denied recov­
ery.21 The primary concern in Feres was that sUbjecting the federal 
government to liability under the FTCA would produce inconsistent 
results because the laws of the states vary and the Act requires that the 
law of the state where the tort occurred controls.22 According to the 
doctrine set forth in Feres, because of the distinctly federal relationship 
between a member of the service and the government, the only time a 
member of the armed forces can recover is when the resulting injury is 
not incident to the service of the member. For example, if a service 
member were on leave he or she would be entitled to recover from the 
government for negligent harm because the relationship between the 
parties at this point would not be distinctly federal in nature.23 Justice 
20. 340 U.S. 135 (1950). 
21. Id. The case was actually a combination of three separate claims brought against 
the government by federal employees claiming negligence on the part of the government. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action brought under the 
FICA. The decedent perished in a fire in the barrack where he was living. The complaint 
alleged that the government had reason to believe the barrack was a fire hazard. Id. at 137. 
In affirming the decision to disallow the claim, Justice Jackson stated: "We know of no 
American law which ever has permitted a soldier to recover for negligence, against either 
his superior officers or the Government he is serving." Id. at 141 (footnote omitted). The 
court reasoned that to permit recovery would subvert military discipline by varying the 
rights of armed forces personnel according to the varied laws of the states as is required 
under the FICA. Id. at 149. See supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text. 
22. For the relevant text of the FICA, see supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
23. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 143 (1950). See Shearer v. United States, 
723 F.2d 1102 (3d Cir. 1983) (holding that the Feres doctrine does not apply where the 
service member was on active leave and thus the injury was not incident to service), rev'd, 
473 U.S. 52 (1985) (recovery under the Act is barred under Feres doctrine). See also 
United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797 (1984). In Varig, Chief Justice Burger wrote 
for the majority and stated: 
From ... legislative and judicial materials, however, it is possible to isolate sev­
eral factors useful in determining when the acts of a Government employee are 
protected .... First, it is the nature of the conduct, rather than the status of the 
actor [that is, controlling rank is irrelevant].... Second, [it was intended that the] 
exception . . . encompass the discretionary acts of the Government acting in its 
role as a regulator of the conduct of private individuals. 
Id. at 813-14 (footnote omitted). 
Similarly, in Anderson v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 470 (E.D. Mo. 1983), the court 
upheld the doctrine where a member of the United States Navy brought a claim under the 
FICA when he was injured because of a fire on a Navy ship. The court stated that "Feres 
requires ... that there be some proximate relationship between the service member's activi­
ties and the Armed Forces." Id. at 472. In Anderson, that relationship existed and the 
court denied recovery. See Comment, Federal Tort Claims Act-Liability a/the Government 
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Jackson, writing for the majority in Feres, provided a synopsis of the 
congressional intent behind the FTCA: "The primary purpose of the 
Act was to extend a remedy to those who had been without. ... [The] 
effect [of the Act] is to waive immunity from recognized causes of ac­
tion ... [but] not to visit the Government with novel and unprece­
dented liabilities."24 Feres acted as a strict ban on recovery for 
military personnel which, until recently, courts have applied rigidly 
with few exceptions. 
In the case of West v. United States,25 the Court of Appeals for 
the Seventh Circuit allowed recovery to a third party whose claim was 
based upon a separate but related action of the service member's.26 
In West, the parents of a daughter who suffered birth defects and ulti­
mate death brought an action in her right because of the negligent 
mistyping of her father's bloodtype.27 The Seventh Circuit found that 
although the negligence was incident to the father's service, the FTCA 
did not bar recovery and the Feres doctrine was inapplicable.28 The 
court found the Feres requirement that the relationship between the 
parties be distinctly federal was lacking. The daughter was ineligible 
for any other government benefits or allowances; furthermore, the 
concern in Feres of subverting military discipline by allowing recovery 
to Servicemen/or Injuries Incident to Service, 99 U. PA. L. REV. 1022 (1951) (arguing that 
the distinction drawn between injuries incident to service is absurd and unfair to service­
men and concluding that whatever inconvenience may be placed on the government for 
liability from injuries incident to service is far outweighed by a policy of decreasing govern­
mental immunity). 
24. Feres, 340 U.S. at 140-41. Justice Jackson also noted that: 
[the] FfCA was not an isolated and spontaneous flash of Congressional generos­
ity. It mark[ed] the culmination of a long effort to mitigate unjust consequences 
of sovereign immunity from suit. While the political theory that the King could 
do no wrong was repudiated in America, a legal doctrine derived from it that the 
Crown is immune from any suit to which it has not consented . . .. [This doc­
trine] was invoked on behalf of the Republic and applied ... as vigorously as it 
had been on behalf of the Crown. As the Federal Government expanded its activ­
ities, its agents caused a multiplying number of remediless wrongs-wrongs 
which would have been actionable if inflicted by an individual or a corporation 
but remediless solely because their perpetrator was an officer or employee of the 
Government. 
/d. at 139-40 (footnotes omitted). 
25. 729 F.2d 1120 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985). 
26. Id. at 1121. 
27. The mother's and father's bloodtypes were in fact incompatible. Id. 
28. Id. at 1123-24. See also In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 
F. Supp. 762 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (holding that the Feres doctrine did not bar the non-deriva­
tive claims of the wives and children of servicemembers who were exposed to agent orange 
while serving in Viet Nam), rev'd on other grounds, 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. 
denied, 456 U.S. 1067 (1981), modified, 580 F. Supp. 1242 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal denied, 
745 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1984). 
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was noticeably absent, because bloodtyping is not distinctly military in 
nature.29 
Several years after Feres, Dalehite v. United States 30 provided an 
informative discussion of the legislative background of the FICA and 
the discretionary function exception. In Dalehite, the plaintiffs 
brought an action against the Tennessee Valley Authority to recover 
damages for deaths caused by an explosion of Fertilizer Grade Ammo­
nium Nitrate produced and controlled by the federal government in 
Texas City, Texas.31 The Supreme Court held that the activity in ques­
tion fell under the discretionary function exception to the FTCA and 
hence the government was immune from liability.32 Justice Reed, 
writing for the majority, said the FTCA was the "offspring of a feeling 
that the Government should assume the obligation to pay damages for 
the misfeasance of [its] employees in carrying out its work."33 How­
ever, Justice Reed added, "it was not contemplated that the Govern­
ment should be subject[ed] to liability arising from acts of a 
governmental nature or function."34 
29. West, 729 F.2d at 1124-26. For a detailed discussion and criticism of Feres, see 
Note, The Cancer Spreads: Atomic Veterans Powerless in the Aftermath ofFeres v. United 
States, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 391 (1984) (arguing that the refusal of the government to 
compensate veterans exposed to radiation in the 1950s leaves the veterans and their families 
to bear the full cost of the injury). See also Comment, An Interpretation of the Feres Doc­
trine After West v. United States and In re "Agent Orange" Product Litigation, 70 IOWA L. 
REV. 737 (1985). 
30. 346 U.S. 15 (1953). 
31. Id. at 17. Dalehite was a test case which represented 300 separate claims against 
the government for a total of more than $200,000,000. Id. The explosion and resulting fire 
which occurred was so tremendous that most of Texas City, Texas was levelled, and many 
lives were lost. Id. at 23. The claim stated that the United States, without properly investi­
gating the chemical fertilizer, "shipped the substance to a congested area without warning 
of the possibility of an explosion under certain conditions." Id. The Supreme Court ruled 
that the decision to institute the fertilizer export program was a discretionary act and the 
combustibility of the fertilizer under conditions likely to be encountered in shipping was to 
be determined by the discretion of those in charge of the production of the fertili.zer. Id. at 
37-38. The policy of producing and storing the fertilizer was undertaken as a means to deal 
with the government's obligation after World War II, as occupying power of Germany, 
Japan, and Korea, to feed the popUlations of those countries. Id. at 19. 
32. Id. at 41-42. 
33. Id. at 24. 
34. Id. at 28 (footnote omitted). But see Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 
315, 318 (1957). In Rayonier, the Supreme Court ruled that the United States was not 
immune from liability for the negligence of government firefighters (Forest Service) if under 
similar circumstances a private person would be liable. Justice Blackmun, writing for the 
majority, disagreed with the result in Dalehite and stated: 
It may be that it is "novel and unprecedented" to hold the United States account­
able for the negligence of its firefighters, but the very purpose of the Tort Claims 
Act was to waive the Government's traditional all-encompassing immunity from 
tort actions and to establish novel and unprecedented governmental liability. 
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The decision in Dalehite to undertake the chemical production, 
storage, and transportation was made at the administrative leveps and 
thus was within the character of actions specifically exempted from 
liability under Section 2680(a) of the Act.36 The Court defined the 
scope of the discretionary function exception in clear language: 
"[T]he discretionary function or duty that cannot form a basis for suit 
under the Tort Claims Act includes more than the initiation of pro­
grams and activities. It also includes determinations made by execu­
tives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or 
schedules of operations."37 Thus, not only was the decision to pro­
duce the fertilizer discretionary, but the actions taken to plan and 
carry out the operation were discretionary and unreviewable.38 
Problems for the federal courts arise when they are faced with the 
inevitable task of defining a discretionary act. The courts often strug­
gle to categorize the negligent or wrongful acts as belonging to one of 
two categories, administrative/planning or operational. This effort to 
Id. at 319. 
35. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 37. 
36. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
37. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 35-36 (footnote omitted). See also Moffit v. United States, 
430 F. Supp. 34 (E.D. Tenn. 1976). In Moffit, the plaintiff claimed that she was sexually 
assaulted by an employee of the United States Postal Service. She also claimed the assault 
was a foreseeable consequence of the negligence of the postal service in hiring the employee 
because he had a criminal record. Id. at 37. The court did not rule on the issue of whether 
the hiring of the employee was discretionary. Id. at 38. It did say, however, that" 'the 
exemption for discretionary functions seeks to insulate from judicial inquiry the propriety 
of basic policy decisions made by officials ... [who have] broad and pervasive decision­
making responsibility.''' Id. at 38 (quoting Downs v. United States, 382 F. Supp. 713, 747 
(M.D. Tenn. 1974». 
38. Dalehite, 346 U.S. 15. Although the Supreme Court found the actions taken by 
the government negligent but unreviewable, the Court weighed heavily the fact that the 
government had been producing and controlling fertilizer with no difficulty for over three 
years prior to the explosion. The Court found that since the government had experienced 
consistent success with past operations, it had no reason to believe it was operating danger­
ously. Id. at 38. The Court in Dalehite also had to deal with the issue of absolute liability. 
The petitioners argued that the government should be liable regardless of the nature of its 
conduct because the damages arose from a decision to engage in an inherently dangerous 
activity. Id. at 44-45. Justice Reed agreed that the degree of care used in performance of 
the activity is irrelevant when the issue is strict liability, however, the FTCA "requires a 
negligent act ... [by an employee and it is the court's] judgment that liability does not arise 
by virtue ... of United States ownership of ... or ... engaging in an 'extra-hazardous' 
activity." Id. at 45 (citing United States v. Hull, 195 F.2d 64, 67 (1st. Cir. 1952». Justice 
Jackson, writing for the dissent, advocated a stricter standard of due care to be placed upon 
the government. His position was that if the government is going to undertake an activity, 
it should be subject to the same standards of safety as a private individual or corporation. 
Id. at 53 (Jackson, J., dissenting). For a descriptive analysis of the Dalehite decision, see 
Mathews, Federal Tort Claims Act-The Proper Scope ofthe Discretionary Function Excep­
tion, 6 AM. U.L. REV. 22 (1957). 
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categorize usually results in an attempt to distinguish between a negli­
gent implementation of a policy decision and a negligent policy judg­
ment itself, without any clear guidelines. Traditionally, if the decision 
is categorized as a negligent policy judgment, the decision is immune. 
Congress drafted § 2680(a) as a clarifying amendment to assure 
governmental protection from tort liability for errors in administrative 
decisions.39 The Supreme Court in Dalehite attempted to define the 
scope of the FTCA by quoting the testimony before the House Judici­
ary Committee of an Assistant Attorney General concerning the 
meaning of § 2680(a): 
[The purpose of the exception is to avoid] "any possibility that the 
act may be construed to authorize damage suits against the Govern­
ment growing out of a legally authorized activity," merely because 
"the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious." It 
was not "intended that the constitutionality of the legislation, the 
legality of regulations, or the propriety of a discretionary adminis­
trative act, should be tested through the medium of a damage suit 
for tort. "40 
The Supreme Court in Dalehite viewed the FTCA as an historical 
achievement by Congress. By enacting the FTCA, Congress had 
manifested an intent to exclude the federal government from litigation 
for claims regarding distinctly governmental functions, and yet the 
government could be brought into court to answer for wrongs in some 
instances. 
Two years after Dalehite, the Supreme Court substantially broad­
ened the application of the FTCA and the discretionary function ex­
39. Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 26-27. 
40. Id. at 27 (quoting Tort Claims Act: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and 6463 Before the 
House Comm on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1942) (statement by Assistant 
Attorney General Francis M. Shea». The House Report on the debate of the Act adopted 
language very close to that of the Assistant Attorney General. The report stated: 
[This paragraph, § 2680(a), characterized as] a highly important exception, in­
tended to preclude any possibility that the bill might be construed to authorize [a] 
suit for damages against the Government growing out of an authorized activity, 
such as, a flood-control or irrigation project, where no negligence on the part of 
any Government agent is' shown, and the only ground for suit is the contention 
that the same conduct by a private individual would be tortious .... The bill is 
not intended to authorize a suit for damages to test the validity of or provide a 
remedy on account of such discretionary acts even though negligently performed 
and involving an abuse of discretion. 
Tort Claims Act: Hearings on H.R. 5373 and 6463 Before the House Comm. on the Judici­
ary, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1942) (statement by Assistant Attorney General Francis M. 
Shea), quoted in Dalehite, 346 U.S. at 29. 
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ception in United States v. Indian Towing Co. 41 In Indian Towing, the 
United States Coast Guard was held liable for negligently maintaining 
a lighthouse.42 The light in the lighthouse had gone out, leaving navi­
gators in the area in a perilous position.43 The plaintiffs sued under 
the FTCA, alleging negligence due to the failure of the Coast Guard to 
check the battery and sun relay system, which operated the light­
house.44 In ruling that the discretionary function exception did not 
exempt the government from liability in this instance, Justice Frank­
furter stated: "The Coast Guard need not undertake the lighthouse 
service. But once it exercised its discretion to operate the light ... and 
engendered reliance on the guidance afforded by the light, it was obli­
gated to use due care to make certain that the light was kept in good 
working order ...."45 
The primary issue considered was whether there was negligence 
at the administrative or operational level. The Supreme Court con­
cluded that the malfunctioning light was negligence at the operational 
level: thus, the government was held accountable.46 In sum, under 
the FTCA, the government could be held liable only for failing to 
maintain a certain standard of care after the discretionary decision to 
undertake the lighthouse had been made. 
Recently, the Supreme Court returned to a narrow interpretation 
of the FTCA in United States v. Varig Airlines.47 In that case, Varig 
41. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). 
42. Id. 
43. Id. at 62. 
44. Id. at 63. For an argument that Indian Towing is explainable by the fact that 
operating a lighthouse is not a uniquely governmental function, see Case Comment, The 
Federal Claims Act After Indian Towing, 58 W. VA. L. REV. 312 (1955). But see United 
States v. Indian Towing Co., 350 U.S. 61, 70 (1955) (Reed, J., dissenting) (the establish­
ment of a lighthouse is a uniquely governmental function under 14 U.S.C. § 83). 
45. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. at 69. Justice Reed, writing for the dissent, argued for a 
narrow interpretation of the FTCA, which he believed should not be read with "extrava­
gant generosity so as to make the Government liable in instances where no liability was 
intended by Congress." Id. at 75 (Reed, J., dissenting). He further argued that if Congress 
intended to create liability for all incidents, that intention should be made plain. Id. Thus, 
the cautious application of the FTCA in Feres and Dalehite was advocated as the solution 
to the problem in Indian Towing. 
46. Id. at 63. See also W. PROSSER & W. KEATON, ON TORTS § 131 (5th ed. 1984). 
In this text the principle is derived that if the alleged negligent conduct is at the planning 
level it is protected by immunity, but once a decision is taken at the planning level it is not 
immune and must be carried out with reasonable care. 
47. 467 U.S. 797 (1984). In Varig, a fire started in one of the lavatories on board a 
Boeing 747 owned by Varig. The fire caused the death of a majority of the passengers and 
the jet was destroyed. [d. at 800. The FAA had decided'to implement a program under 
which it was left to the manufacturers of the jets to comply with government safety regula­
tions. Id. at 805. The federal employees involved decided that the best way to enforce 
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Airlines brought an action against the United States under the FfCA, 
seeking damages for the deaths of passengers and for the destruction 
of a jet. The plaintiffs claimed that the Federal Aviation Administra­
tion (FAA) had been negligent by only "spot checking" and not fully 
inspecting the jet. The Supreme Court, relying heavily on Dalehite 
ruled that the actions taken by the (FAA) were discretionary: 
As in Dalehite, it is unnecessary-and indeed impossible-to define 
with precision every contour of the discretionary function excep­
tion. . . . In administering the "spot check" program, these FAA 
engineers and inspectors [encountered certain] risks, but those risks 
were encountered for the advancement of a governmental purpose 
and pursuant to the specific grant of authority in the regulations 
and operating manuals. Under such circumstances, the FAA's al­
leged negligence in failing to check certain specific items in the 
course of certificating a particular aircraft falls squarely within the 
these standards in light of limited resources was to perform "spot checks." Id. at 817. 
Chief Justice Burger stated that, although negligent, the actions taken by the FAA fell 
within the discretionary function exception: 
[T]he acts of the FAA employees in executing the "spot-check" program in ac­
cordance with agency directives are protected by the discretionary function ex­
ception.... The FAA employees who conducted ... [the inspections] were 
specifically empowered to make policy judgments regarding the degree of confi­
dence that might reasonably be placed in a given manufacturer, the need to maxi­
mize compliance with FAA regulations, and the efficient allocation of agency 
resources. 
Id. at 820 (citation omitted). 
Both Varig and Indian Towing dealt with negligent inspections on behalf of the gov­
ernment. However, the distinguishing element between the cases is that the Court in Varig 
was primarily concerned with an allegedly negligent policy decision regarding inspection, 
while in Indian Towing the alleged negligence was the failure of the Coast Guard to inspect 
and maintain the lighthouse. 
Varig only held that the spot checking policy was discretionary. It did not categori­
cally hold that under all circumstances the negligent checking of an airplane would be 
inactionable. In other words, the government could not be held liable on the policy judg­
ment made at the administrative level for the reasons set forth by Chief Justice Burger, but 
the government conceivably could, under the Indian Towing rationale, be held liable for the 
inspection at the operational level if some causal link between a negligent inspection and 
the resulting crash could be established. 
State courts do not necessarily apply the same standards as the federal courts do when 
establishing liability for negligent inspections by state agencies. In fact, liability is often 
imposed for negligent inspections. For example, in Ingram v. Howard-Needles-Tammen & 
Bergendoff, 234 Kan. 289, 672 P.2d 1083 (1983), a truck driver was killed after his truck 
encountered a four foot by five foot-six inch hole in a bridge caused by deck deterioration. 
Id. at 290, 672 P.2d at 108. The Supreme Court of Kansas ruled that highway inspectors 
contracted by the State Transportation Department had a legal duty to the public to exer­
cise reasonable care when inspecting the bridge. Id. at 292, 672 P.2d at 1084. Liability was 
imposed because the contractors had made only a visual inspection of a bridge and failed to 
recommend repairs for a bridge which was in obvious need of an overhaul. 
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discretionary function exception of § 2680(a).48 
Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, also expressed the 
view that courts should be reluctant to venture into an area where they 
have neither the expertise nor authority to determine what was or was 
not a good decision. "Judicial intervention ... through private tort 
suits would require the government to 'second guess' the political, so­
cial and economic judgment of an agency exercising its regulatory 
function. "49 
Therefore, the Court found the decision by the FAA to spot 
check and to place the duty of complying with the safety standards 
upon the manufacturers to be discretionary and unreviewable. so It is 
apparent that the Court was aware of the limited funds which Con­
gress allocates to government agencies and the pressures inherent in 
allocating funds in a proper fashion. Because so much debate and con­
troversy surrounds the system of allocation, the Court distanced itself 
from what is appropriately a legislative function. The decision by the 
Supreme Court in Varig Airlines reversed a lower court trend of set­
ting strict limitations upon the discretionary function exception. 5 1 
The Court maintained that the FAA has a duty to promote aviation 
safety but not to insure it. 52 
Federal courts of appeals have applied extensively the discretion­
ary function exception standards set forth in Dalehite. In Nevin v. 
United States 53 the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
the government's choice to use a particular strain of bacterium in a 
simulated attack on the City of San Francisco in 1950 was made at the 
planning level and thus was exempt from liability under the discretion­
48. Varig, 467 U.S. at 813, 820. 
49. Id. at 820. For a further discussion of Varig Airlines, see Comment, United 
States v. Varig: Can the King Only Do Little Wrongs?, 22 CAL. W.L. REV. 175 (1985) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court failed to seize a golden opportunity to define the scope of 
the discretionary function exception). 
50. Varig, 467 U.S. at 820. Accord Shuman v. United States, 765 F.2d 283 (1st Cir. 
1985). The First Circuit found the government not liable for failing to promulgate a policy 
regarding a duty to warn government contractors about the hazards of asbestos. Conclud­
ing that the omission fell within the discretionary function exception, the court applied the 
Dalehite and Varig decisions and concluded: "The government's omission of a policy re­
quiring the Federal Department of Labor, or others acting under its authority, to warn the 
endangered workers themselves of a work hazard was a discretionary ... function excep­
tion to the FTCA." Id. at 290. 
51. See, e.g., De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 146 (5th 
Cir. 1977) (holding that the government cannot resort to the discretionary function excep­
tion for admiralty claims). 
52. Varig, 467 U.S. at 821. 
53. 696 F.2d 1229 (9th Cir. 1983). 
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ary function exception to the FfCA.54 In reaching this conclusion, 
the Ninth Circuit relied on Dalehite and reaffirmed that the purpose of 
the discretionary function exception was to permit the government to 
be free from liability for negligence associated with planning level deci­
sions.55 Echoing earlier concerns expressed by the Supreme Court, the 
Ninth Circuit showed a reluctance to have the courts evaluate the ac­
tivity in question because it would "impair the effective administration 
of the government."56 
Despite the broad interpretation of the discretionary function ex­
ception in Nevin, the Ninth Circuit in another instance has narrowed 
its application. 57 In Lindgren v. United States,58 a water skier brought 
an action against the United States for damages sustained when the 
skier struck the bottom of the Colorado River below Parker's Dam, 
which was operated by the government. 59 The claim alleged that the 
Bureau of Reclamation knew that the area was used for recreation but 
failed to warn users of the fluctuations in water level caused by the 
dam.6O In applying the discretionary function exception, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that although government operation of a dam tradition­
ally is considered to fall within the discretionary function exception, 
the government may have a duty to warn of a danger if the exercise of 
the discretion creates that danger.61 In this instance the operation of 
the dam created the danger and therefore the government had a duty 
to warn of the potential hazard. 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 1230. See a/so Sellfors v. United States, 697 F.2d 1362 (11th Cir. 1983) 
(holding that FAA traffic controllers were not liable for failing to sight birds which were 
later ingested by a plane's engine and resulted in the crash of that plane and death of the 
pilot. The court ruled that no duty existed on the part of the controllers and, even if a duty 
did exist, the failure to sight the birds fell within the discretionary function exception to the 
FTCA). 
56. Nevin, 696 F.2d at 1230. 
57. See United States v. Yarig Airlines, 692 F.2d 1205 (9th Cir. 1982), rev'd, 467 
U.S. 797 (1984). In Varig, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the government is barred form 
resorting to the discretionary function exception when failing to comply with certain FAA 
standards and that the negligent inspection of the jet was similar to the negligence in Indian 
Towing. Id. at 1209. 
58. 665 F.2d 978 (9th Cir. 1982). 
59. Id. at 979. 
60. Id. 
61. Id. at 980-82. The court cited cases which held government failure to warn of 
hazards actionable: Smith v. United States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976) (holding that the 
decision not to warn visitors of hazards in undeveloped areas of Yellowstone Park must be 
judged separately from the discretionary function exception); United States v. Washington, 
351 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1965) (holding that the failure of the government to warn aviators of 
unmarked electric power lines was actionable). 
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B. 	 Limits On The Scope Of The Federal Tort Claims Act As 
Applied To Admiralty Actions 
Congress has legislated that there are certain activities to which 
the discretionary function exception does not apply.62 In such cases, 
the remedy against the government for liability arising out of that ac­
tivity must be sought under the specific statute governing that activity. 
Admiralty actions provide one such example. The FTCA specifically 
provides in § 2680( d) that "provisions of this chapter and section 
1346(b) of this title shall not apply to- ... (d) Any claim for which a 
remedy is ... provided [under the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA)] 
relating to claims or suits in admiralty against the United States."63 
General confusion over the scope of the discretionary function 
exception is compounded in the case of admiralty actions. Congress 
exempted suits under the SIAA from the limitation on liability in the 
discretionary function exception based upon a consensus among legis­
lators that the liability of the government should be coextensive with 
that of private shipowners and shippers because the government was a 
primary participant in merchant shipping. 64 
The relationship between § 2680( d) and the SIAA has been inter­
preted in various ways. On the one hand, some courts have read 
§ 2680(d) to mean that the discretionary function exception does not 
62. 	 See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
63. 46 U.S.c. § 742 (1982) provides in part: 
In cases where ... such vessel were privately owned ... or possessed, or if a 
private person or property were involved, a proceeding in admiralty could be 
maintained, any appropriate nonjury proceeding in personam may be brought 
against the United States or against such corporation [mentioned in section 741 of 
this title]. Such suits shall be brought in the district court of the United States for 
the district in which the parties so suing, or any of them, reside or have their 
principal place of business.... 
Id. 
Enacted in 1920, the statute barred any proceeding in rem against a vessel or cargo 
owned by the United States. See H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT, 
724-30 (3d ed. 1979). 
64. De Bardeleben Marine Corp. v. United States, 451 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1977). 
In De Bardeleben, plaintiffs brought an action against the United States under the SIAA for 
damage resulting when an anchor on a barge ruptured a natural gas pipeline. Id. In pro­
claiming that the discretionary function exception is not included in the SIAA, the court 
said "[t]he words of the statute, its legislative history, the liberal approach in interpreting 
waivers of immunity, and the senseless absurdities which would result belie the narrow 
reading that the Government ... givers] to the [SIAA]." Id. at 145. See also G. GILMORE 
& c. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 982-83 (1975). The authors state that this 
concern was due to the increased participation of the United States in the shipping busi­
ness. The waiver of sovereign immunity in the SIAA was in order to subject the United 
States to the same liability as a private individual. Id. 
375 1987] FORECASTS FOR DISCRETION 
apply to the SIAA.65 These courts have reasoned that if Congress had 
intended to include the SIAA within the discretionary function excep­
tion, it would have done so explicitly.66 On the other hand, some 
courts have been willing to apply the discretionary function exception 
to a claim brought under the SIAA. These courts have reasoned that 
by enacting the FICA and the discretionary function exception, Con­
gress intended that the government would not be held accountable for 
discretionary actions leading to claims brought under the SIAA.67 
II. THE EKLOF AND BROWN DECISIONS 
The confusion over the scope of the discretionary function excep­
tion in the context of suits in admiralty was brought to the fore in the 
recent cases of Eklof Marine Corp. v. United States 68 and Brown v. 
United States. 69 In Eklof, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals found 
the discretionary function exception inapplicable and held the Coast 
Guard liable for inadequately marking a reef.70 In Brown, the First 
65. See infra notes 66-67. 
66. Hillier v. Southern Towing Co., 714 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1983). In Hillier a 
"coast-guardsman" was sent to monitor the discharge of ammonia from a barge. He died 
on the barge from inhaling ammonia fumes. His widow sued the United States under the 
SIAA, alleging that the Coast Guard was negligent in failing to train the decedent and to 
provide him with adequate equipment. Id. at 717. The court stated that "[t]here is no 
evidence that by amending the ... [SIAA] Congress authorized the courts to subject the 
United States to novel and far-reaching judge-made liabilities ...." Id. at 722. 
67. See Coastwise Packet Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d 77 (1st Cir. 1968), cert. 
denied, 393 U.S. 937 (1968); Beeler V. United States, 256 F. Supp. 771 (W.O. Pa. 1966). 
See also M. NORRIS, THE LAW OF MARITIME PERSONAL INJURIES 3D (Supp. 1987), 
which states: 
The question of whether the discretionary function exception should be implied in 
the SIAA ... has ... produc[ed] a conflict between ... [the circuits]. The Fourth 
and Fifth Circuits ... refuse[] to imply ... [an] exception, arguing that Congress 
should cure the statute if the waiver of sovereign immunity is too extensive. The 
First Circuit has adopted the opposite position and has implied ... [the] discre­
tionary function exception. 
Id. at § 150 (quoting Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 559 (7th Cir. 1980». 
The disagreement among the courts developed as a result of the congressional amend­
ment to the SIAA in 1960. Congress amended the SIAA to read, "or if a private person or 
property were involved" and deleted the words "vessel or cargo owned by the United 
States." 46 U.S.c. § 742 (1982). The effect of the amendment was that a petitioner was no 
longer limited to bringing an action in admiralty against the government which pertained 
solely to a government owned vessel or cargo. In essence, the amendment allowed suits in 
admiralty to be brought against the government if the claim could be brought against a 
private citizen. Thus, there were many more claims in admiralty brought against the 
United States as a result of this. 
68. 762 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1985). 
69. 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 938 (1987). 
70. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204. 
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Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the reasoning of Eklof, applied the 
discretionary function exception, and found the government not liable 
for the failure to repair a buoy used as a source of weather 
information.71 
A. Eklof Marine Corp. v. United States 
On June 14, 1983, the M/V Reliable was travelling north on the 
Hudson River toward its destination of Albany, New York. The Reli­
able ran aground at Diamond Reef, the site of previous groundings. 72 
The Coast Guard, acting under its charter, 14 U.S.C. § 2,73 had 
marked the southern end of the reef with one navigational buoy. The 
crew of the Reliable relied upon the buoy when they passed through 
Diamond Reef. Due to the grounding, the Reliable suffered tremen­
dous damage.74 
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reversed the lower 
court decision and found for the plaintiffs.75 The court held that the 
Coast Guard had in fact been negligent, and reasoned that since the 
Coast Guard had decided to act, it must act reasonably or suffer the 
consequences of liability for negligence.76 The court concluded that 
once the Coast Guard had acted in a way that allowed navigators to 
rely on its action, it could be held liable for not measuring up to a 
proper standard of care. "It is reliance that gives rise to the Coast 
Guard's duty."77 
In reaching this result, the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir­
71. Brown, 790 F.2d at 203. 
72. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 201. 
73. 14 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) describes the primary duties of the Coast Guard: 
a) enforcement and assistance in the enforcement of federal laws on the high seas; 
b) administration, promulgation, and enforcement of regulations for the promotion of 
safety on the high seas; c) development, establishment, maintenance and operation of aids 
to navigation, icebreaking facilities and rescue missions; d) engaging in oceanographic re­
search; and e) maintenance of a state of readiness to function in the Navy during times of 
war. Id. See also 14 U.S.c. § 81 (1982). Section 81 sets forth the general description of the 
Coast Guard's duties with respect to navigational markings for the military. It provides: 
"In order to aid navigation and to prevent disasters, collisions, and wrecks of vessels and 
aircraft, the Coast Guard may establish, maintain, and operate: ... aids to maritime navi­
gation ...." Id. 
74. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 200. The plaintiff's claim was for a total of $382,000. 
75. Id. at 201. The lower court dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12b(6). 
76. Id. at 202. The court said that where the Coast Guard has acted to mark an 
obstruction or maritime danger, a duty arises to do so in a way that does not create a new 
hazard. 
77. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 202-03. Reliance is a standard maxim of tort law. 
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cuit relied primarily on United States v. Indian Towing CO.78 The 
court in Eklof drew an analogy between the facts before it and Indian 
Towing. The Second Circuit recognized that under Indian Towing 
there was in fact no statutory duty of the Coast Guard to undertake 
the marking of the reef. However, the court concluded that although 
the "instant case does not present the situation of a malfunctioning 
lighthouse, ... the duty of the Coast Guard ... [was] essentially the 
same: once the Coast Guard acts, and causes others justifiably to rely 
on such action, a duty arises to act . . . with due care . . . . "79 The 
Eklof court reasoned that once the Coast Guard had made the discre­
tionary decision to mark the reef, it was obligated to ensure that it was 
marked correctly and safely. A common element in both Eklof and 
Indian Towing was that the negligence by the government occurred at 
the operational level as opposed to the administrative level. 
The Second Circuit contended its decision was consistent with the 
Fourth Circuit opinion in Somerset Seafood Co. v. United States. 80 In 
Somerset, the Court of Appeals found the Coast Guard liable for neg­
ligence in maintaining a navigational buoy over 500 feet from the posi­
tion of a sunken wreck.81 The court in Eklofadopted the reasoning in 
Somerset, and concluded that even if the decision to mark or remove 
the wreck be regarded as discretionary there should be liability for 
negligence in marking the buoy at Diamond Reef, even after the dis­
cretion has been exercised and the decision to mark the reef was 
made.82 
While approving the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' decision in 
Somerset, the court refused to follow the First Circuit's opinion in 
Chute v. United States. 83 In Chute, the Coast Guard's decision to 
78. 350 U.S. 61 (1955). 
79. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 203. 
80. 193 F.2d 631 (4th Cir. 1951). 
81. Id. at 640. In Somerset, shipowners brought suit under the FICA against the 
government for damages arising from the sinking of the plaintiff's ship due to the negligent 
marking of a wreck by the United States. Id. at 633. The Fourth Circuit, finding the 
government liable, ruled that even if the decision to mark or remove the wreck were re­
garded as discretionary, there was liability for negligence in marking after the discretion 
had been exercised and the decision to mark had been made. Id. at 635. The court further 
stated that the proper location of a buoy depended upon "many factors, including ... the 
width of the channel, ... the depth of the water, ... the volume of vessel traffic, and the 
probable effect of ice or storms on the buoy." Id. at 637. See also United States v. Travis, 
165 F.2d 546 (4th Cir. 1947) (holding the government liable for placing a buoy 350 feet 
away from a wreck); United States v. Bickel, 46 F.2d 988 (4th Cir. 1931) (government was 
held liable when the buoy was placed only 200 feet away from the wreck). 
82. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 203. 
83. 610 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1979). In that case, an abandoned United States Navy vessel 
was being used as a bombing target by the Navy. The Coast Guard placed a buoy, three 
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mark a submerged navy wreck was held unreviewable. The First Cir­
cuit expressed the position that if the discretionary function is to re­
main meaningful, the choice as to when and how to mark the danger 
must in all cases be final. 84 
The court in Eklofdisagreed with three concerns expressed by the 
Chute court. First, the Eklof court took issue with the First Circuit's 
fear that the jury would be unable to determine whether the Coast 
Guard breached its duty of care. To this concern the Second Circuit 
responded, "We commit for decision to courts and juries many issues 
of equal or greater complexity and importance than the than the ques­
tion of whether a marine obstruction was properly marked."85 Sec­
ond, the court in Chute held that imposing liability on the Coast 
Guard in this situation would force the Coast Guard to choose the 
most effective and best means of marking an obstruction, thus placing 
an unfair burden upon the Coast Guard and setting a dangerous prece­
dent. 86 The Second Circuit in Eklof said the answer to this concern 
was that the method chosen must be proven only to be reasonable 
under the circumstances and not the "best" available.87 Lastly, the 
Second Circuit disagreed with the First Circuit's position that courts 
have "neither the expertise, the information, nor the authority to allo­
cate ... finite resources ... among competing priorities."88 The Sec­
ond Circuit responded to this concern by asserting that the standard of 
review is what is reasonable under the circumstances: 
Every case must be judged on its particular facts, and liability must 
be determined, once a duty has been found to exist, by reference to 
the surrounding circumstances and the knowledge, or lack thereof, 
on the part of the alleged tortfeasor. In short, while reliance defines 
the duty, reasonableness defines its breach. 89 
and one half feet tall, to mark the site of the vessel. Plaintiff's boat ran into the marker and 
two passengers were severely injured. Id. at 9. In Chute, the claim was brought under 14 
U.S.C. § 86 (1982) which reads: "The Secretary ... may mark for the protection ... of any 
sunken vessel or other obstruction existing on any navigable waters of the United States in 
such manner and for so long as, in his judgment, the needs of maritime navigation require." 
Id. 
84. Chute, 610 F.2d at 12. 
85. Eklof, 752 F.2d at 204. 
86. Chute, 610 F.2d at 13. 
87. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204. 
88. Chute, 610 F.2d at 12. 
89. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204. 
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B. Brown v. United States 
In Brown v. United States,90 the plaintiffs, representatives of sev­
eral deceased fishermen, brought a claim in the United States District 
Court for the District of Massachusetts under the SIAA. The claim 
alleged that the federal government was negligent for failing to repair 
or replace a malfunctioning weather observation buoy. The lower 
court found the National Weather Service liable for the death of the 
fishermen because it had failed (primarily due to the defective buoy) to 
predict a storm, which led to the death of the fishermen. 91 
The National Weather Service formulates its predictions mainly 
from information received by the National Meteorological Center 
(NMC) in Washington, D.C.92 The NMC acquires the bulk of its in­
formation from weather observation buoys which transmit the infor­
mation gathered via satellite to the NMC. This information is then 
sent to the regional NWS offices which use the information to prepare 
forecasts.93 The problem in Brown originated with the malfunctioning 
weather observation buoy 6N12, located at the Georges Bank buoy 
station, which apparently had been damaged by a passing ship. On 
September 9, 1980, the government discovered that the buoy was send­
ing faulty wind speed and direction information.94 The NMC contin­
ued to log the data from 6N12 but ceased sending it to the NWS. The 
United States Government Data Buoy Center (NDBC) had made two 
unsuccessful attempts to replace 6N12 and had made no repairs to it.95 
At noon on November 21, 1980, the fishermen of the boats FlY 
Fairwind and FlY Sea Fever left the port of Hyannis, Massachusetts 
to engage in lobster fishing. Prior to leaving, the crew, in accordance 
with custom, listened to the 11:00 AM weather forecast which pre­
dicted good weather. Early the next day, the boats arrived at the fish­
ing spot and the weather turned severe.96 The reports that the NWS 
90. 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 938 (1987). 
91. Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877, 877 (D. Mass. 1984). 
92. Id. Congress established the duties of the NWS in 15 U.S.C. § 313 (1982). That 
section reads: "The Secretary of Commerce shall have charge of the forecasting of weather 
... and flood signals for the benefit of agriculture, commerce, and navigation, ... [and] the 
distribution of meteorological information ... as may be necessary to establish and record 
climate conditions of the United States ...." Id. 
93. Brown, 790 F.2d at 201. 
94. Id. at 200. The wind sensor on the buoy was malfunctioning, a condition known 
as "spiking." 
95. Id. at 202. The NDBC had on two separate occasions lost buoys which were 
destined to replace 6N12. The plaintiffs argued that the failure of the government to replace 
or repair 6N12, because the buoy was scheduled to be replaced the following January, was 
a breach of a duty of due care. Brown, 599 F. Supp. at 887. 
96. Brown, 790 F.2d at 200. 
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had furnished were in error and by the time the reports accurately 
reflected the current weather it was too late to return to the harbor. 
The Fairwind sank in the violent storm and three of its crew were 
lost.97 
Based on these facts, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit 
reversed the lower court decision and found the government not liable 
for the negligent forecast.98 The court in Brown dismissed the Eklof 
reasoning, stating: "[t]he [Ekloj] court has read the discretionary 
function exception right out by finding it does not apply at precisely 
the place to which it is particularly directed."99 
The Brown court rejected the plaintiffs' claim that the govern­
ment's failure to repair or replace the buoy was negligent. The govern­
ment argued that it had no actionable duty and, even if it did, it had 
acted reasonably under the circumstances. loo The First Circuit ap­
plied Indian Towing 101 and the rationale behind Chute 102 to reverse 
the lower court. The court defined the issue to be "whether the gov­
ernment, by issuing reports, assumed a duty to invest in that activity 
whatever resources a court might find necessary in order to achieve 
what ... [the government] believed to be proper care."103 Thus, the 
court relied on a different aspect of Indian Towing, finding that there 
were two principles involved in determining liability: "[T]he govern­
ment's free right to engage, or not, in discretionary functions, but with 
a cut-off where by [sic] its conduct, ... has induced justified reliance 
on its adequate performance."I04 
In explaining these two principles, the court relied on the Chute 
interpretation of Indian Towing. lOS The court in Chute said, 
"[l]iability was not imposed in . . . [Indian Towing] because a more 
97. Id. The plaintiffs in Brown produced an expert witness who testified that if the 
correct reports had been coming from the buoy, the NWS would have been able to forecast 
the storm in time for the boats to return to port safely. The government countered this 
argument by stating that 6N12 was not malfunctioning at the time the storm developed 
and, therefore, the expert witness' testimony should not be given any weight. Further, the 
government argued that it was not using 6N12 at that time, and that it had no "actionable 
duty" toward the plaintiffs. Id. at 200-01. 
98. Id. at 204. 
99. Id. at 202. 
100. Id. at 200. But see Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877 (D. Mass. 1984). 
The lower court held the government liable for the forecast by applying traditional tort 
standards of duty, breach, causation and damage. Id. at 884-88. 
101. Indian Towing, 350 U.S. 61. 
102. Chute, 610 F.2d 7. 
103. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202. 
104. Id. at 201. 
105. Id. For a further discussion of the Chute court's interpretation of Indian Tow­
ing, see M. NORRIS, supra note 67, at § 151. 
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powerful light or taller lighthouse would have been a better warning of 
the rocks marked by the lighthouse, but rather because the negligent 
non-functioning of the ... [advertised] lighthouse misled plaintiff to 
his detriment."106 The First Circuit observed that "[t]he rationale of 
Chute was that although the Coast Guard is known to have under­
taken marking dangers to navigation, the extent to which it will do so 
is a discretionary function. There can be no justified reliance upon, or 
expectation of, any particular degree of performance; something more 
is needed to establish liability."107 The First Circuit in Brown reiter­
ated its earlier concern in Chute that courts have neither the expertise 
nor authority to allocate finite resources. 108 
Perhaps the most important language in Brown is its sharp criti­
cism of the Eklofdecision. The court held that the Second Circuit had 
misunderstood the teaching of Indian Towing by failing to recognize 
"the pernicious consequences that could flow from its approach."109 
For example, Coast Guard officials with necessarily limited funds, un­
able to afford three buoys, may decide to place no aids to navigation 
rather than risk the consequences which may arise if they mark the 
danger inadequately.l1o These cases demonstrate that the role courts 
should play in the allocation of government resources has developed 
into a major area of disagreement between the First and Second 
Circuits. 
III. THE REASONS FOR THE DIFFERENT OPINIONS AND THE 

FUTURE IMPLICATIONS 

The extensive analysis and discussion in Brown and Eklof dem­
onstrates that the respective courts have reached carefully reasoned 
decisions. Yet, the similarity of facts and issues in these cases inevita­
bly gives rise to speculation about the different judicial treatment they 
have received. 
On the one hand, the Eklof court ruled that once the Coast 
Guard acted, that action induced or engendered reliance which led to 
the grounding of the Reliable. Based on this logic, the court ruled that 
the action undertaken at the outset of the marking of the reef must be 
performed with a reasonable duty of care. The court found that the 
initial decision to mark the reef was an administrative decision and 
106. Id. at 201 (quoting Chute, 610 F.2d at 13-14). 
107. Id. at 201-02. 
108. Id. at 202. 
109. Id. at 202 n.S. 
110. Id. 
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unreviewable. In consequence, if the Coast Guard had chosen not to 
mark the reef, it could not be held liable. III 
In Eklof, the court found that the positioning of the buoy or the 
inadequacy of marking the site with a single buoy were the primary 
reasons for the grounding of the Reliable.ll2 The court rejected the 
government's contention that the position of the buoy was a planning 
rather than an operational function. 
The decision, however, to place a navigational aid at a particular 
location or to employ only one such aid at that location, as opposed 
to the initial decision to mark the obstruction, is not an expression 
of any "policy" of which we are aware and does not constitute an 
executive branch decision ....113 
Based upon this reasoning, the court found the marking of the reef to 
be reviewable. 
On the other hand, the First Circuit in Brown decided that the 
decision to continue to develop forecasts for the area where the fisher­
men met their demise without the aid of 6N12 was discretionary and, 
therefore, unreviewable. I 14 Thus, the discretionary decision to under­
take the job of weather forecasting was unreviewable. In Brown, it was 
established that the malfunctioning buoy, although allegedly not being 
used at the time, led to the inaccurate forecast. If the buoy had not 
been spiking, the NWS undoubtedly would have used the accurate in­
formation to calculate a more reliable forecast. 
In sum, the courts were faced with two situations involving gov­
ernment positioned and employed buoys. There is little, if any, con­
ceptual difference between a mispositioned buoy and a malfunctioning 
buoy; both foreseeably will cause damage. Significantly, in both in­
stances the government was aware of the problems the buoys were 
creating. In Eklof, other navigators apparently had relied on the buoy 
to their detriment. llS Yet the Coast Guard took no affirmative meas­
ures to secure the area to prevent further damage to passing ships.116 
In Brown, the NWS was aware of the spiking condition of 6N12 and 
the NDBC had attempted unsuccessfully to repair and replace 6N12. 
However, it continued to issue weather reports for the area despite 
Ill. Id. See also Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556, 560 (7th Cir. 1980) (the 
Coast Guard was held not liable for electing not to erect a light in Chicago Harbor as a 
navigational aid), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980). 
112. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 203. 
113. Id. at 205. 
114. See supra notes 90-105 and accompanying text. 
115. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 201-02. 
116. Id. at 203-04. 
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ceasing to use data supplied by 6N12.117 
In reaching different results, one point of disagreement between 
the courts of appeal was the interpretation of Indian Towing. The Sec­
ond Circuit reasoned that since the Coast Guard in Indian Towing was 
under a duty to maintain the lighthouse in a manner which would not 
undermine the reliance engendered, it therefore followed that the 
Coast Guard in Eklof was under a duty to ensure that the reef was 
marked appropriately and would not become a trap for the naviga­
tor,l1S instead of a warning of the danger. 
The Brown court declared that this application went too far. The 
First Circuit inserted the facts before it into the Eklof formula and 
reached a startling result: "The government established the service for 
the benefit ... of [the] fishermen; fishermen relied upon it; the govern­
ment knew they would rely on it; therefore the government induced 
reliance; having induced reliance, it became obligated to use due 
care."119 The First Circuit agreed that this formula was ostensibly 
sound, but viewed the formula as proving too much, for, under its 
reasoning, non-users would be the only parties to whom the discre­
tionary function exception would apply.120 
The First Circuit was also very critical of the manner in which 
the Second Circuit applied the term "reliance." For the First Circuit, 
the issue was not just reliance, but "justified reliance."121 The Brown 
court concluded that there was a significant difference between a light­
house and a navigational buoy. In Indian Towing, the Coast Guard 
decided to mark the danger with a lighthouse; this was the extent of its 
undertaking. The Coast Guard could be held liable, according to 
Brown, only for failing to maintain the lighthouse as advertised, but 
not for the extent to which it had marked the danger. 122 In Eklof, the 
extent to which the Coast Guard marked Diamond Reef was with a 
single buoy. This decision was, therefore, according to Brown, a dis­
cretionary matter. The Coast Guard could be held accountable only if 
it failed to maintain the buoy as advertised. 123 
A further distinction between the two cases is that while both 
suits were brought under the Suits in Admiralty Act, the two courts 
applied the statute differently. This issue was for the most part not 
117. Brown, 790 F.2d at 200. 
118. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 203. 
119. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202. 
120. Id. 
121. Id. at 203. 
122. Id. at 202. 
123. See Chute v. United States, 610 F.2d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1979). 
384 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:361 
discussed by either court. One reason for the silence may be the con­
troversy which the courts have created concerning the SIAA. 
The Second Circuit, in Eklof, barely mentioned that the suit was 
brought by the owners of the Reliable under the SIAA.124 It made 
casual mention of the waiver of sovereign immunity in the SIAA while 
discussing the Coast Guard's duty of care. 125 In concluding that the 
Coast Guard must do whatever is necessary to ensure that the place­
ment of the navigational aid does not create a new danger, the court 
stated: "This [duty] is simply a consequence of the waiver of sovereign 
immunity represented by the Suits in Admiralty Act ...."126 With 
this reasoning, the Second Circuit upheld its earlier decisions and the 
decisions of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits that the discretionary func­
tion exception does not apply to actions brought under the SIAA.127 
These courts of appeals have held that by amending the SIAA in 1960, 
Congress attempted to cure only a jurisdictional problem within the 
SIAA.128 Furthermore, courts have expressed the view that past ex­
periences with the FTCA compelled Congress to exclude it from the 
SIAA. The justification for this judicial interpretation is that the ex­
clusion of the discretionary function exception will encourage careful 
planning and implementation of activities by government agencies. 
The Brown court never dealt with the implication of refusing to 
apply the discretionary function exception to a claim brought under 
the SIAA. For whatever reason, the court simply disregarded the is­
sue, perhaps because the court considered it to be fully adjudicated 
under the First Circuit's previous decisions. The First Circuit's view 
is that the exception must be implied in the SIAA because the 1960 
amendment opened the door for suits against the government based 
124. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. 
127. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 700 F.2d 836 (2nd Cir. 1983) (under the 
SIAA the United States waives sovereign immunity with respect to cases which fall under 
46 U.S.c. § 742 (1982»; Lane v. United States, 529 F.2d 175 (4th Cir. 1975) (the SIAA 
contains no discretionary function exception; furthermore, the FfCA contains a specific 
exception of claims for which the SIAA provides a remedy); De Bardeleben Marine Corp. 
v. United States, 451 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1971) (amendments to the SIAA disavow govern­
ment immunity in admiralty actions). 
128. See S.REP. No. 1894, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1960 U.S. CODE CONGo 
& ADMIN. NEWS. 3583. The report indicated that due to the confusing language of the 
SIAA as well as the Public Vessels Act, claimants spent an inordinate amount of time 
deciding in which forum to bring their claims. The result was a massive amount of misfil­
ings. The difficulty arose from the attempt to distinguish between merchant and public 
vessel status. Id. 
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upon the standard "as a private person would be."129 The argument 
made is that Congress could not have overlooked the fact that the 
agency being sued will of necessity have limited resources available 
for the establishment of programs. 130 The argument is furthered by 
the concern that by precluding the application of the discretionary 
function exception, the taxpayers and the public treasury will be bur­
dened unfairly because all claims will be paid by the public.!3! An­
other concern of the First Circuit was that fear of judicial review will 
result in inaction by agencies which traditionally act for the benefit of 
the public good.!32 
A. The Circuits Switched 
Despite the disagreements over the interpretation of Indian Tow­
ing and the SIAA, the most important distinction between Brown and 
Eklof is that the fishermen in Brown relied on a weather forecast, 
rather than the buoy itself, as was the case for the navigators in Eklof 
In the words of the First Circuit, "the representation was not the 
129. See Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536 (1st Cir. 1976) (the discretionary 
function exception is implied in the SIAA), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 (1977). See also 
Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877 (D. Mass. 1984) (the discretionary function ex­
ception does apply to the SIAA), rev'd, 790 F.2d 199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 
938 (1987). 
130. The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has adopted the reasoning of the First 
Circuit and now applies the discretionary function exception to the SIAA. See Hillier v. 
Southern Towing Co., 714 F.2d 714 (7th Cir. 1983) (holding that there is no evidence that 
by amending the SIAA Congress authorized the courts to subject the United States to novel 
liabilities); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1980) (1960 amendment to the 
SIAA cured a jurisdictional problem only and Congress intended that the discretionary 
function exception should still apply to the SIAA), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 837 (1980). 
131. Gercey v. United States, 540 F.2d 536, 538-39 (1st Cir. 1976). The Supreme 
Court, however, dismissed this concern in Rayonier Inc. v. United States, 352 U.S. 315 
(1957). The Court ruled that the burden on the taxpayers of paying the costs of these suits 
will be relatively light because the cost will be spread out among the taxpayers. Id. at 320. 
132. See, Comment, The Discretionary Function Exception and the Suits in Admiralty 
Act: A Safe Harbor for Negligence?, 4 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 385, 411 (1981). The 
comment states that the legislative history is unclear and there is no certainty as to why 
Congress did not legislate expressly that the discretionary function exception should not 
apply to the SIAA. Id. The comment concludes that the fact that Congress did not pro­
vide for the exception either expressly or by reference is circumstantial evidence that it did 
not consider any of the FTCA exceptions necessary or applicable to the SIAA. Id. at 411­
12. The conclusion is that the approach of the Fourth and Fifth Circuit Courts of Appeals 
is favorable because of the legislative history, proper statutory construction, more equitable 
results for injured parties, and encouragement of responsible agency operations which will 
benefit the public. Id. at 413. The comment dismisses the concern of agency inaction 
because that result simply has not occurred. Finally, the argument is made that if the pub­
lic expense is of concern to Congress, Congress could always amend the SIAA and include 
the discretionary function exception. Id. 
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buoy, but the prediction."!33 The fact that the representation relied on 
was a weather forecast weighed heavily on the mind of the court. The 
court made reference to the inherent unreliability of weather forecasts 
and expressed a reluctance to establish a reviewable duty of care in the 
area of government weather forecasting.n4 "A weather forecast is a 
classic example of a prediction of indeterminate reliability, and a place 
peculiarly open to debatable decisions, including the desirable degree 
of investment of government funds and other resources."!35 The court 
noted that weather forecasts "fail on frequent occasions."136 
If the forecast itself were the only matter at issue, the First Cir­
cuit's decision in Brown would be entirely consistent with other deci­
sions dealing with liability of the federal government for negligent 
weather forecasting. 137 Virtually all of the cases which address this 
issue have ruled in favor of the government for two, reasons: a 
weather forecast is a representation specifically exempted from review 
by virtue of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h),138 and forecasting is never 100% 
reliable. 
The Brown court faced a factually more complicated setting 
which dealt with government liability for weather forecasts. 139 Unlike 
133, Brown, 790 F.2d at 203. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 204. To hold the NWS to a higher standard would undoubtedly force the 
service to disclaim expressly the reliability of the weather forecasts, an uninviting and non­
sensical prospect. 
136. Id. 
137. See Williams v. United States, 504 F. Supp. 746 (7th Cir. 1980). In that case, an 
airplane pilot brought an action against the Federal Aviation Administration and the NWS 
for failing to predict the weather accurately. The court, ruling for the government, said: 
"Predicting the weather is not an exact science ... [and weather forecasting is a discretion­
ary function exception to the FTCA]." Id. at 750. See National Mfg. Co. v. United States, 
210 F.2d 263 (8th Cir. 1954). In that case, the plaintiffs brought an action under the FTCA 
claiming the NWS had carelessly and negligently disseminated misinformation regarding 
the course of floodwater. The court held that there was no cause of action for recovery of 
damages from floods or floodwater and the weather service has a wide latitude of discretion 
to determine whether in their opinion, a particular forecast is appropriate. The forecasts or 
omissions of forecasts by the Bureau is a discretionary function. Id. at 750. 
For an analysis of National Manufacturing, see Note, Federal Tort Claims Act-The 
Non Liability ofthe United States for Negligent Weather Forecasts, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
228,228-32 (1954) (arguing that unlike a radio station or newspaper, the weather bureau is 
in the business of weather forecasting (warning) and should be held liable as a corporation 
would be for acting negligently). 
138. 28 U.S.c. § 2680(h) (1982) specifically says the government cannot be held lia­
ble for any misrepresentations by its employees or services. For a listing of the other excep­
tions to the FTCA see supra note 17. 
139. See Chanon v. United States, 350 F. Supp. 1039 (S.D. Tex. 1972), afJ'd, 480 
F.2d 1227 (5th Cir. 1973). In Chanon, the administrators of the estates of two deceased 
fishermen brought suit against the United States under the FTCA claiming negligence on 
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the previous cases, there was an act or omission in Brown which made 
the forecast less reliable than it would have been had the buoy been 
functioning properly. The government in Brown knew about the pos­
sibility of an inaccurate weather forecast because of 6N12, but did not 
take any measures to warn of the possible consequences. l40 
The Second Circuit probably would have ruled that the actions 
taken by the government in Brown were reviewable and ultimately 
negligent. The Second Circuit likely would reason that the nature of 
the activity is irrelevant and it is the decision to act and create the 
forecast which engenders reliance on the forecast and, therefore, the 
government must use reasonable care in carrying out this activity. 
While a reliance standard appears to be ostensibly sound, it is not the 
standard Congress called for in the FfCA. Congress called for liabil­
ity to be imposed on the federal government if, under the same cir­
cumstances, a private person would be liable. 141 
The question asked by the Brown court was whether the steps 
taken by the government in Eklofwere reasonable. For the First Cir­
cuit the answer to this depended upon congressional allocations of re­
sources combined with the concept of justified reliance on the part of 
the plaintiff. 142 To rule otherwise would cause the courts to second­
guess the legislature, a task which the First Circuit refused to under­
take. 143 Therefore, according to Brown, under all the circumstances 
in Eklof the actions taken by the Coast Guard were reasonable be­
cause limited resources were allocated to these agencies to undertake 
the activities, and the buoy was positioned as advertised. The First 
Circuit also applied standards not expressly set forth in the FfCA: 
justified reliance was not contemplated by the Congress. It appears 
that the circuits are applying judge-made rather than congressional 
standards. 
An inconsistency appears when one applies the justified reliance 
the part of the government for its failure to disseminate accurate weather information. The 
court held, that an erroneous forecast standing by itself is not actionable. Id. at 1041. 
140. But see United States v. Sandra & Dennis Fishing Corp., 372 F.2d 189 (1st Cir. 
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 836 (1967). In that case, the Coast Guard attempted a rescue 
mission which resulted in the sinking of the plaintiff's vessel. Id. at 191. The Coast Guard 
apparently maintained inadequate equipment to complete the mission. Id. at 193-95. The 
suit was brought under the FTCA, and the First Circuit, relying on Indian Towing, held 
the Coast Guard liable because the Coast Guard must not induce reliance upon a belief that 
it was providing something it was not. Id. at 195. The court considered the delinquent 
equipment maintained on the boat, and also the fact that the boat was the only vessel 
available to attempt the rescue mission. Id. 
141. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
142. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202-04. 
143. Id. at 204. 
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reasoning to the facts of Brown, for it seems to mandate a finding of 
liability. There is no doubt that the government was not employing 
6N12 at the time of the storm; thus the forecast was not as reliable as 
the government advertised it would be. The extent of the NWS under­
taking was to employ 6N12 as a properly functioning weather obser­
vation buoy. It would be interesting to see what the First Circuit 
would have ruled if the government had not expended resources to 
attempt to repair or replace 6N12, or if the government lacked accu­
rate information from all weather buoys in the area, but issued a fore­
cast anyway. Perhaps, in the face of such facts, the court would have 
imposed liability because of the sheer inadequacy of the equipment. In 
Brown the overriding factor was, of course, the nature of the activity 
relied upon: the weather forecast. 144 From its language, the First Cir­
cuit implied that the government would still remain protected in this 
instance even if it did nothing: 
[I]n the case at bar, the government did not create the weather; it 
merely failed, in the [lower] court's opinion, to render adequate per­
formance. . . . [T]his was a discretionary undertaking . . . [by the 
government, and the lower court] failed to respect the ... provision 
... [in § 2680, which is] "whether or not the discretion involved 
was abused."14S 
In the court's opinion, the discretion was not abused by deciding to 
issue weather forecasts for the area. 146 
Obviously, the Second Circuit would disagree strongly with the 
above reasoning. For the Second Circuit, the entire question revolved 
around the standard of reasonableness. The Eklof court maintained 
that the solution to the inconsistency in the cases dealing with govern­
mental liability would be to apply the traditional negligence stan­
dards: "The law of negligence teaches ... that one who acts must do 
so reasonably in light of what is foreseeable and that reasonableness is 
the threshold to liability."147 
When this reasoning is applied to the facts of Eklof, the imposi­
tion of liability seems logical and equitable. Since the Coast Guard 
was aware of the other groundings at Diamond Reef, it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the other accidents would occur. The court, however, 
144. Brown, 790 F.2d at 204. But see Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877, 887 
(D. Mass. 1984). The plaintiffs did not contend the government was negligent because the 
weather forecast was incorrect, but rather because the government failed to replace 6N12. 
Id. 
145. Brown, 790 F.2d at 203 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1982». 
146. Id. at 202. 
147. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204. 
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carried this reasoning further than its application in Indian Towing 
when it stated that "the Coast Guard must maintain navigational aids 
in proper working order with whatever cost that entails, it also must 
ensure that its placement of those aids does not create a new danger 
"148 
The court in Brown offered two reasons for disagreeing with the 
conclusion that an agency must expend whatever resources are neces­
sary to ensure safety. First, the court echoed the concern of the 
Supreme Court in Varig that judicial interference in the area of legisla­
tive allocation of resources would lead to undesirable results.149 The 
argument is made in Brown that the courts are not in a position to 
review how much money is available for certain agencies and their 
respective undertakings. The allocation of finite resources is not a ju­
dicial undertaking and therefore the only branch of government with 
the ability to handle these matters is the legislature. ISO Second, if the 
Coast Guard, or any agency, were subject to such strict standards the 
result would be a reluctance to carry out their duties, duties which in 
the long run benefit the public. l51 The response to these concerns is 
that the courts have never had difficulty interpreting congressional in­
tent, and the idea of judicial review would likely spur agency action 
rather than inaction. ls2 
It is difficult to envision that a reasonableness standard would re­
sult from the application of the Eklof approach. Under Eklof reason­
ing, the discretionary function exception seems to be stripped of its 
purpose.IS3 A slight change in the surrounding environment which 
148. Id. (citations omitted). 
149. Brown, 790 F.2d at 204. One of the possible results suggested by the Supreme 
Court in Varig is that federal courts could become a forum for arguments on the allocation 
of federal tax dollars to government agencies, a task much better left to the legislature. 
Varig, 467 U.S. at 814. 
150. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202. The argument is based on the separation of powers 
enunciated in the United States Constitution. The First Circuit in Brown was echoing this 
argument from the earlier cases: Varig, 467 U.S. 797; Dalehite v. United States, 345 U.S. 
15 (1953); Bearce v. United States, 614 F.2d 556 (7th Cir. 1980). cert. denied. 449 U.S. 837 
(1980); Gercey V. United States, 540 F.2d 536 (1st Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 954 
(1977). 
151. In contrast to this concern, one article suggests that fear of liability for negligent 
decisions will lead to desirable results. See Comment. supra note 133. For example, if the 
Coast Guard knew in Indian Towing of the possible consequences of the failed light it 
would have been compelled to inspect the light. See supra note 98. The argument is made 
that lack of a discretionary function exception to the SIAA has not resulted in undesirable 
results as the First and Seventh Circuits might suggest. There has been no discernible rate 
of inaction by government agencies. 
152. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
153. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202. 
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would go undetected during a routine inspection of a marked site or 
the placement of a buoy could, under certain circumstances, be found 
to have been unreasonable and thus negligent. The Eklof court would 
probably dismiss this concern and rejoin that the government would 
be held liable only for foreseeable consequences. IS4 It does, however, 
seem illogical to hold a government agency with limited resources lia­
ble under this standard, because it is necessarily constrained by con­
gressional appropriations which are, of course, discretionary. 
Perhaps the best way to show the future effect of the Eklof ap­
proach is to apply the standards to a further situation. If the Coast 
Guard had marked Diamond Reef with four or five buoys and an acci­
dent occurred, the result conceivably would be liability on the part of 
the government. This outcome is possible because it would be for a 
jury to determine whether the marking was reasonable and whether, 
once the Coast Guard undertook the marking, it was required to ex­
pend whatever resources were necessary to make the reef danger 
proof. Similarly, if the facts of Brown were before the Second Circuit, 
the government arguably would have been held liable for the negligent 
forecast because it failed to expend whatever resources necessary to 
make the forecast accurate, a duty the government incurred by estab­
lishing a weather service. ISS 
IV. 	 A PROPOSED AMENDMENT TO THE DISCRETIONARY 
FUNCTION EXCEPTION 
A. The Need for an Amendment 
The choice must be made whether to allow government agencies 
to act with discretion or subject them to a strict standard of review. 
The decision reached by the First and Seventh Circuit Courts of Ap­
peals seems appropriate. 156 These courts reason that it is better for 
the government to undertake the activity and perform to the extent of 
its resources. If the courts choose to follow the reasoning of the Sec­
ond, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits,157 the government official may 
choose to not act at all. The counter argument is that, realistically, 
agencies will not cease their activity and deprive the navigator of "half 
a loaf, usually thought better than none,"ISS but rather the actions 
154. Eklof, 762 F.2d at 204. 
155. See supra notes 77-81 and accompanying text. 
156. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text. 
157. See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
158. Brown, 790 F.2d at 202 n.5. The First Circuit used this phrase when discussing 
the implications of non action by government agencies. The phrase clarifies the court's 
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taken truly will benefit the public. 159 The problem with this view is 
that it undermines the scope of the discretionary function exception. 160 
Is half the loaf usually better than none? A navigator who sees 
one buoy and follows standard operational procedures stands a much 
greater chance of avoiding a disaster than one who has no navigational 
buoy to follow. The same can be said for the lobster fisherman who 
will undoubtedly benefit in the long run from the weather forecasts 
provided by the NWS. Unfortunate circumstances will sometimes re­
sult, but the strong argument remains that it is better to act than not. 
There may be a need for a more accurate weather service or more 
accurate marking of navigational dangers, but this is not an area 
where a reasonable standard of care rationally can be applied. The 
application of this standard may produce judicial second-guessing of 
legislative decisions and the imposition of unwarranted liabilities on 
government agencies. 
The solution to the inconsistent application of the FTCA among 
the United States Courts of Appeals is not readily apparent. Perhaps a 
ruling by the Supreme Court concerning issues similar to those posed 
in Brown and Eklof would provide an answer. The Court previously 
has ruled that the judicial branch of the government should be reluc­
tant to venture into areas traditionally governed by the legislature. 161 
The Court's present point of view is that agency action is better than 
inaction and that such a strict standard of review placed upon govern­
ment agencies might very well result in a cessation of action. 162 Inher­
opinion that the imposition of strict standards upon the government will have devastating 
effects on the agencies. 
159. See supra note 131. 
160. Brown, 790 F. 2d at 202. See supra notes 12-40 and accompanying text. The 
original intent behind the discretionary function exception was to insure that unprece­
dented liabilities were not placed upon the government, and that the government would 
remain strong due to the freedom of agency decisionmaking. See also w. Katzke, The 
Convergence of the Discretionary Function Exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act with 
Limitations of Liability in Common Law Negligence, 60 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 221 (1986). 
The article argues that the courts should take into consideration various factors in deter­
mining whether government activity falls within the discretionary function exception, in­
cluding the ability of the court to evaluate the reasonableness of the conduct or decision; 
whether it is an area where the courts should be intruding, the extent and seriousness of the 
injury, and the relationship between the government and private interests in each situation. 
[d. at 285. 
161. See supra notes 10-61 and accompanying text. 
162. United States v. Yarig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 814 (1984). The Supreme Court 
in Varig dealt with a policy judgment by a regulatory agency dissimilar to an agency such 
as NWS. See Brown v. United States, 599 F. Supp. 877 (D. Mass. 1984), rev'd, 790 U.S. 
199 (1st Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 938 (1987). The Supreme Court in Varig offered 
a test to determine whether liability should be imposed on a regulator. The first question to 
be asked under this test is whether the government is acting in its role as a regulator of the 
392 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:361 
ent in agency action are certain risks encountered by officials who plan 
and implement policies. The risks are not discounted by the officials; 
rather, they are balanced against the benefits to the public good. If the 
benefits outweigh the risks, the policy is implemented. 
In light of the nature of the activity undertaken combined with 
the efforts to repair 6N12, the First Circuit opinion in Brown would 
likely be upheld by the Supreme Court. The relevant precedent ap­
plied would be Indian Towing and Varig Airlines. The Court would 
have to distinguish reliance on a weather forecast and a lighthouse, 
ultimately balancing its conclusion against the pro-governmental im­
munity language in Varig. Cognizant of the Second Circuit opinion in 
Eklof, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to impose liability on the 
government for the discretionary undertaking. Again, the court 
would need to balance the issue of reliance with the current Court 
position on discretion. 
B. The Proposed Amendment 
The ultimate solution to the problem is to be found within the 
legislature. Perhaps the cure for judicial inconsistency would be for 
Congress to incorporate a reliance standard into the FTCA. This 
could be done by amending the discretionary function exception to 
read: 
Section 1346(b) of this title shall not apply to (a) any claim based 
upon an act or omission of an employee of the government exercis­
ing due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation whether or 
not such regulation be valid, or upon the exercise or performance or 
the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty 
on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the government 
whether or not the discretion be abused. But if in the execution of 
such discretion the government should cause a claimant to justifiably 
rely upon the exercise or peiformance of the function or duty, the 
government may under the circumstances be held liable. 
This amendment would serve two purposes. The courts would at last 
have a mandate to apply a standard which they have been eager to 
utilize. Secondly, since the reliance standard has precedential legiti­
conduct of private individuals; second, whether the conduct of the government employee as 
opposed to his or her status, is "of the nature and quality that Congress intended to shield 
from tort liability." Varig, 467 U.S. at 813. If the Supreme Court were to find that the 
NWS is a regulator of private individual's conduct, the government would need to prove as 
it apparently has, that its conduct in not replacing 6N12 is the type that Congress intended 
to shield from liability. 
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macy, the courts would be prohibited from venturing into new stan­
dards of liability. Thus, the end result should be consistency. 
By incorporating this terminology into the discretionary function 
exception, the congressional Act would appear to be consistent with 
the Supreme Court's holding in Indian Towing. 163 In an identical situ­
ation, a claimant would need to establish that, through the exercise of 
the discretion, the government caused the plaintiff to rely justifiably on 
the establishment of the lighthouse. However, assuming such an 
adoption, it does not appear likely that a court would impose liability 
on the government for a negligent forecast because of the inherent un­
reliability of forecasts. To prevail, the plaintiff would need to prove 
that, under the circumstances, the government caused a reasonable 
person justifiably to rely on the forecast. If the government were 
found liable, the case would not establish a precedent for all negligent 
forecasts, just those regarding which the plaintiff established justifiable 
reliance. In a scenario of a misplaced or mispositioned navigational 
buoy, the plaintiff would need to show that a reasonable person under 
all of the circumstances would have justifiably relied on the placement 
of the buoy. 
The reliance standard will not necessarily undermine the purpose 
of the discretionary function exception. Rather, it will provide the dis­
cretion asked for by Congress and also provide a standard by which 
aggrieved parties can bring a cause of action. The reliance standard, 
while totally absent from the legislative history, may actually help to 
further the original intent of Congress in enacting the FfCA. Injured 
parties will be able to present their cases in a judicial forum but, in 
order to do so, they will need to meet a specific reliance standard. It 
seems unlikely that this standard will invite more actions against the 
government, because the burden of proof will be clearly established 
prior to the beginning of litigation. The statute will not require the 
plaintiff to prove the merits of the case prior to litigation, but rather 
will force the plaintiff to focus on the issues to determine whether the 
action is justified. 
v. CONCLUSION 
The courts are in desperate need of further legislative clarity. Un­
less the courts receive such guidance in interpreting the scope of the 
FfCA, the discretionary function exception, and the SIAA, the gov­
ernment will find that it is liable in some courts for actions ruled im­
163. See supra notes 41-45 and accompanying text. 
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mune from liability in others. The prospect of future inconsistency 
places an unfair burden upon government agencies seeking to imple­
ment beneficial programs nationwide. 
Martin D. Auffredou 
